Strength in Cognitive Self-Regulation by Ayla Barutchu et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 11 April 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00174
Strength in cognitive self-regulation
Ayla Barutchu1, Olivia Carter 2, Robert Hester 2 and Neil Levy 1,3*
1 Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
2 Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
3 Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, The University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Edited by:
Shulan Hsieh, National Cheng Kung
University, Taiwan
Reviewed by:
Miriam Gade, University of Zurich,
Switzerland
Yoav Kessler, Ben-Gurion University of
the Negev, Israel
Yang Jiang, University of Kentucky,
USA
*Correspondence:
Neil Levy , Florey Institute of
Neuroscience and Mental Health, The
University of Melbourne, Parkville,
VIC 3010, Australia.
e-mail: neil.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Failures in self-regulation are predictive of adverse cognitive, academic and vocational out-
comes, yet the interplay between cognition and self-regulation failure remains elusive.
Two experiments tested the hypothesis that lapses in self-regulation, as predicted by the
strength model, can be induced in individuals using cognitive paradigms and whether such
failures are related to cognitive performance. In Experiments 1, the stop-signal task (SST)
was used to show reduced behavioral inhibition after performance of a cognitively demand-
ing arithmetic task, but only in people with low arithmetic accuracy, when compared with
SST performance following a simple discrimination task. Surprisingly, and inconsistently
with existing models, subjects rapidly recovered without rest or glucose. In Experiment 2,
depletions of both go-signal reaction times and response inhibition were observed when a
simple detection task was used as a control.These experiments provide new evidence that
cognitive self-regulation processes are influenced by cognitive performance, and subject
to improvement and recovery without rest.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-regulation is fundamental to human function, with many
psycho-social problems, including drug addiction, obesity, and
gambling, being directly linked to lapses in the capacity to main-
tain control over behavior and function. It is widely believed to
be dependent on a range of dissociable processes, including atten-
tion, decision-making, volition, and the inhibition of unwanted
impulses. Recently, there has been a surge of research in support of
the strength model of self-regulation (for meta-analysis see Hagger
et al., 2010). According to this model, self-regulation across var-
ious domains, ranging from cognition to social processes, draws
upon a common resource that depletes with use (Baumeister et al.,
1998; Baumeister and Vohs, 2007), and replenishes with rest or
glucose intake (Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007;
Tyler and Burns, 2008). On a wide range of tasks requiring self-
regulation, performance suffers if the task is preceded by another
also requiring self-regulation even if the tasks are unrelated. For
instance, participants will persist with squeezing a handgrip for a
significantly shorter period of time after having to control their
emotions while watching a sad movie (Muraven et al., 1998). The
depletion of control resource has been reported in other species
too (Miller et al., 2010). Many researchers believe that resource
depletion partially explains many cases of lapses in self-regulation,
ranging from ordinary overeating through to addictive behaviors,
and impulsive violence (e.g.,Vohs and Heatherton, 2000; Baumeis-
ter et al., 2006; Baumeister and Tierney, 2011; Hofmann et al.,
2012).
The ability to self-regulate has been associated with better per-
formance on cognitive tasks and also with vocational and academic
success (Mischel et al., 1989; Goldberg and Grandey, 2007; Jonker
et al., 2010). Prior engagement in self-regulation (e.g., emotional
control) can impede later cognitive performance (Schmeichel
et al., 2003; Schmeichel, 2007). Higher fluid intelligence has been
associated with greater depletion (Shamosh and Gray, 2007).
However, of particular concern are the existing inconsistencies
in the way cognitive paradigms are employed in self-regulation
studies and the outcomes they yield. For example, in dual task
paradigm experiments, arithmetic tasks have been used both as
controls for depletion tasks that require relatively greater levels
of self-regulation (Muraven et al., 1998, 2006), and as follow-up
tasks to assess the effects of resource depletion on self-regulation
(Wright et al., 2003, 2008; Vohs et al., 2005). There is independent
evidence that arithmetic tasks, particularly those that involve con-
tinual switching between different problem types (e.g., additions
and subtractions), are associated with the depletion of cogni-
tive resources such as executive control and working memory
(Schneider and Anderson, 2010). In contrast, researchers studying
resource depletion have argued that simple arithmetic problems
are over learnt and automated in adults, and that the level of self-
regulation engaged by such tasks can be expected to be dependent
on individual ability (Baumeister and Tierney, 2011). However,
the hypothesis that the depleting effects of such cognitive tasks are
dependent on individual performance levels has not been tested.
There are a number of factors that have been identified as hav-
ing a replenishing effect on self-regulation. Glucose intake (e.g.,
Gailliot et al., 2007), rest, and sleep are often associated with
better self-regulation ability. Even brief periods of rest, less than
10 min, can result in the replenishment of self-regulation resources
(Baumeister et al., 2006; Tice et al., 2007; Tyler and Burns, 2008).
Given that people often have to maintain high levels of cognitive
regulation for extended periods in daily life (e.g., undergraduate
students often have to sit though 1 h lectures and maintain a high
level of cognitive regulation), questions about the dynamics of self-
regulation throughout continual task performance are important.
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Self-regulation has generally been explored using very brief single
episode tasks (i.e., less than 10 min in duration). No study has used
repeated measures across several blocks of the same task to assess
the stability of cognitive self-regulation resources over time.
To date most studies of resource depletion have also relied on
between group designs and measures of persistence to demon-
strate that self-regulation is depletable. Such persistence measures
are limited in their ability to inform whether worsened perfor-
mance is caused by a decrease in subjects’ motivation or by an
impaired capacity to self-regulate (Levy, 2011). Indeed people are
less likely to show depletion if motivated or given incentives to
maintain self-regulation (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003; Stewart
et al., 2009), or if people believe, or are led to believe, that self-
regulation capacity is unlimited (Job et al., 2010). An aim of this
study was to provide data about how self-regulation is engaged
within the cognitive domain in individuals when discontinuing
the task is no longer perceived as a salient option by subjects. We
also aimed to investigate whether the depletion of self-regulation
within the cognitive domain is influenced by individual differences
beyond those highlighted by Job et al. (2010).
In the present study, we took advantage of the natural wide-
spread variability in arithmetic performance, and used a switching
arithmetic task that had previously been shown to have depleting
effects on cognitive resources (Schneider and Anderson, 2010).
It is well accepted within the cognitive literature that both arith-
metic and “switching” tasks are highly dependent on cognitive
control mechanisms, including the ability to shift attention and
regulate information in working memory (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010;
Schneider and Anderson, 2010); it is hypothesized that switch-
ing arithmetic tasks can deplete cognitive resources. We classified
individuals based on their performance on the arithmetic task, and
used the stop-signal task (SST) to investigate whether such cog-
nitive depletion can influence the capacity to regulate and inhibit
proponent motor responses to “go” signals following infrequent
“stop” signals. Our principal aim was to investigate the relation-
ship between performance and self-regulation. The SST has been
widely used to investigate the behavioral and neural processes of
cognitive control and response inhibition in various populations
(Logan et al., 1997; Band et al., 2003; Alderson et al., 2007). If self-
regulation depletion within the cognitive domain is dependent on
task performance and cognitive ability, as predicted by Baumeis-
ter and colleagues, than the depletion of self-regulation should
only be observed in individuals with low performance accuracy.
It was also hypothesized that once resources are depleted, self-
regulation will not recover across consecutive blocks of the SST
without rest.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-eight healthy adult volunteers participated in this study
(10 males and 28 females, M Age= 21; 6 and SD= 3; 5). Age is
denoted in years; months. Participants were recruited using poster
advertisements. All participants had normal or corrected to nor-
mal vision, normal hearing and no prior history of neurological
or psychiatric disorders. Participants were paid AUD $ 20 for their
time.
Self-regulation depletion – arithmetic tasks
The effects of resource depletion were investigated using a switch-
ing arithmetic task, which included two types of simple problems:
no-carry addition problems (e.g., 52+ 23= 75), and no-borrow
subtraction problems (e.g., 47–16= 31). Equations switched ran-
domly between addition and subtraction problems. On half the
trials, the answers presented were correct, and on the remaining
half incorrect. Incorrect problems were randomly calculated as
either ±2 or ±9 relative to the correct answer. All three terms of
correct and incorrect problems included double-digit numbers,
allowing for the generation of a large sample of unique problems:
992 additions and 1008 subtraction problems fit these criteria
(excluding problems with multiples of 10 in the first two terms).
Arithmetic problems were presented vertically (see Figure 1A) for
a duration of 2.5 s with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) randomly
varying between 1.5 and 2.5 s in four blocks of 48 trials. Correct
and incorrect addition and subtraction problems were selected
from all possibilities, and presented in random order with an equal
probability. The duration of each block was approximately 3 min.
Between blocks, participants were given the option of a very short
break (<1 min) to stretch or re-adjust if needed. Total duration of
the task was about 13 min.
For the resource depletion condition, participants were asked to
solve the problems and to indicate whether the answer was correct
or incorrect by pressing keys with their index and middle fingers.
The control version of the task, which will be referred to as the sign
discrimination task, was identical to the arithmetic task except that
participants were asked to ignore the numbers and the solution
to the problems, and indicate the operation type (i.e., whether
the operation is an addition or a subtraction). This ensured
that stimulus properties and overall task durations were identi-
cal for the arithmetic task and the control sign discrimination
task.
The stop-signal performance task
Following the arithmetic task and the control sign discrimina-
tion task, participants’ performance was assessed using the SST
(see Figure 1B) (Logan et al., 1997). Participants were asked to
respond rapidly to two “go” signals, “X” and “O,” using their index
and middle fingers. On 25% of trials, participants were presented
with a “stop-signal” consisting of a red box, which surrounded
the go-signal. The onset of the “stop-signal” was delayed such
that participants were only able to inhibit their responses on
approximately 50% of trials. This delay time is referred to as
the stop-signal delay (SSD). The initial SSD was set at 250 ms
and incremented or decremented by 50 ms thereafter depending
on the participant’s success and failure at inhibition, to maintain
an overall stopping rate (i.e., a correct response inhibition rate)
at approximately 50%. Only participants with an overall accu-
racy rate above 40% and below 60% on each block of the task
were included in further data analyses (two participants failed
this standard inclusion criterion). The stop-signal reaction time
(SSRT) was calculated as the difference between the go-signal
motor RT (go-RT) and the SSD at which participants could
inhibit approximately 50% of responses (SSRT= go-RT− SSD).
The go-RT and the SSRT were measured across three consec-
utive blocks of 100 trials, which took approximately 15 min to
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 174 | 2
Barutchu et al. Strength in cognitive self-regulation
FIGURE 1 | (A) A single trial of the arithmetic and simple sign discrimination task. (B) A go-trial and a strop-trial of the stop-signal task. (C) Experimental
protocol timeline.
complete (5 min per block). At the end of each block, partic-
ipants were provided with feedback on their accuracy, go-RT
and SSRT, and the option of a very short break (<1 min) if
needed.
Procedure
For this experiment a repeated measures paradigm was employed.
Participants were seated in a quiet room at a distance of 1 m from a
17′′ computer monitor. In the initial practice session, participants
were given practice runs to familiarize themselves with all three
tasks: the arithmetic task, the sign discrimination task and the
SST. For the sign and arithmetic tasks, participants were allowed
up to 48 trials of practice. For the SST, all participants were given
three practice blocks of 25 trials. Practice sessions lasted approx-
imately 10–15 min and were followed by a 10 min rest period.
During the rest period, participants were asked to complete a brief
1 min demographic questionnaire. For the remainder of the time,
participants were encouraged to rest and engage in activities they
found relaxing. The rest period was followed by the first test ses-
sion, during which participants were asked to complete either the
arithmetic or the sign discrimination task followed by the SST. In
the second test session, participants were asked to complete the
alternate task followed by the SST. The order of the arithmetic and
the sign discrimination tasks was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Each test session lasted approximately 30 min. The two test
sessions were separated by a 20 min rest period. During both rest
periods, participants were played relaxing classical music (solo
piano pieces composed by Eric Satie) to minimize any deplet-
ing effects of the preceding tasks (Tyler and Burns, 2008). See
Figure 1C for experimental protocol timeline.
RESULTS
Performance across the four blocks of the arithmetic task was
highly correlated for both RTs (r> 0.85, p< 0.001 for all blocks)
and accuracy (r> 0.6, p< 0.001 for all blocks) measures. To inves-
tigate whether differences in cognitive performance influenced
the depletion of self-regulation resources, participants were sub-
divided into two groups based on their performance on the arith-
metic task: a high accuracy group including participants whose
accuracy measures approached ceiling, with a total error rate
below 5% (n= 20, M error rate= 3.14, SEM= 0.29), and a low
accuracy group with total error rates above 5% (n= 15, M error
rate= 10.54, SEM= 1.24). The high accuracy group consisted of
10 males and 10 females (M age= 21; 7, SD= 3; 5), and the low
accuracy group consisted of 15 females (M age= 21; 2, SD= 2;
5). Error rates for the high and low accuracy groups on the sign
discrimination task floored (averaging< 4% with the exception of
one participant with an overall error rate of 24% who was excluded
from all further data analyses).
The pattern of choice RTs differed between the sign and
arithmetic tasks. Overall, RTs for the detection of additions
(low accuracy group M= 597, SEM= 24.66, and high accuracy
group M= 573, SEM= 21.76) and subtractions (low accuracy
group M= 586, SEM= 20.36, and high accuracy group M= 579,
SEM= 21.72) did not significantly differ on the sign task. In
contrast, for the arithmetic task a two-way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) showed RTs to be significantly faster for additions (low
accuracy group M= 1445, SEM= 89.52, and high accuracy group
M= 1372, SEM= 65.81) than subtractions (low accuracy group
M= 1615, SEM= 100.18, and high accuracy group M= 1505,
SEM= 68.14), F(1,33)= 56.28, p< 0.001, η2= 0.63. Although
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RTs were faster for the high than the low accuracy group, this
difference did not reach significance.
To examine resource depletion in our low and high accu-
racy groups, a depletion measure was calculated for each block
of the SST by subtracting task performance measures follow-
ing the arithmetic task from those that followed the sign task
(i.e., SSRT depletion= SSRT following sign task – SSRT fol-
lowing arithmetic task). As can be observed in Figure 2, the
arithmetic task did not have a depleting effect on individuals
with high accuracy. In contrast, for individuals in the low accu-
racy group, the arithmetic task did have a depleting effect on
SSRT measures, but only on the first block of the SST. A three-
way 2(group)× 2(task)× 3(block) ANOVA showed a significant
three-way interaction,F(2,66)= 4.13, p= 0.02,η2= 0.11. Follow-
up post hoc analyses showed that SSRTs for block 1 were signifi-
cantly slower for the low accuracy group following the arithmetic
task, but not the high accuracy group. A significant correlation
was also observed for SSRT depletion and overall arithmetic task
accuracy at block 1 (n= 35, r =−0.36, p< 0.05), but not block
2 (n= 35, r =−0.21, p> 0.05) or block 3 (n= 35, r =−0.02,
p> 0.05).
Go-signal RTs and SSD measures were also affected by the
preceding task. A three-way ANOVA for go-RT, F(2,66)= 4.56,
p= 0.01, η2= 0.12, and SSD, F(2,66)= 4.31, p= 0.02, η2= 0.12,
measures showed a significant two-way interaction between group
and SST block. Go-RTs and SSD measures did not differ between
groups, however, for the low accuracy group the SSD significantly
increased at block 2, and at both blocks 2 and 3 for go-RT (see
Table 1). The ANOVA main effects and the three-way interactions
for the SSD and go-RT did not approach significance. For the SST
task accuracy measures did not significantly differ between the
groups (see Table 1).
DISCUSSION
The outcomes of Experiment 1 suggest that the depletion of
self-regulation resources is partly dependent on one’s cognitive
performance. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that
well learned tasks are likely to become automated, thereby engag-
ing few self-regulation resources (Baumeister and Tierney, 2011).
Interestingly, contrary to the predictions of the strength model,
impairment of SSRT appeared to recover by the second block of
the SST, however, this recovery was at the expense of go-signal
motor speed; motor RTs were significantly slower for blocks 2 and
3 for the low accuracy group, but not the high accuracy group.
By nature, cognitive tasks, even those as simple as our
sign discrimination task, engage multiple capacities involved in
FIGURE 2 | Mean (±SEM) depletion measures for SSRT (A),
go-RT (B), and SSD for the low accuracy (black line) and high
accuracy (gray line) (C) groups across the three blocks of the
stop-signal task: Block 1 (0–5 min), Block 2 (5–10 min), and Block
3 (10–15 min). Depletion measures were calculated by subtracting
SST task measures following the arithmetic task from those that
followed the sign task (e.g., SSRT depletion=SSRT sign – SSRT
arithmetic), therefore, negative values are representative of a
depletion effect for SSRT and go-RT measures following the
arithmetic task (note that for SSD a negative value is representative
of an improvement in performance). Dashed gray line at zero depicts
no depletion or gain in performance.
Table 1 | Mean (±SEM) percentage (%) accuracy (ACC), motor reaction times for go-signals (go-RT), stop-signal delays (SSD), and stop-signal
reaction times (SSRT) for the three blocks of the stop-signal task following the sign discrimination task and the arithmetic task in Experiment 1.
Sign discrimination task Arithmetic task
ACC Go-RT SSD SSRT ACC Go-RT SSD SSRT
LOW
Block 1 49.87±1.23 453±17.10 230±21.20 223±10.24 49.33±1.01 470±15.16 217±16.97 253±11.01
Block 2 50.04±0.53 480±17.89 248±19.91 232±9.45 49.73±0.67 490±18.85 248±20.75 242±12.93
Block 3 49.69±0.63 486±18.78 243±18.16 242±9.45 50.22±0.41 494±19.76 256±24.34 237±13.53
HIGH
Block 1 49.50±1.01 475±29.93 240±23.18 235±9.49 48.80±0,62 452±11.54 222±12.68 230±6.25
Block 2 49.53±0.60 454±12.86 224±20.32 230±11.44 49.80±0.46 454±9.94 219±14.50 235±10.07
Block 3 49.78±0.30 458±10.49 217±17.08 241±11.69 49.75±0.26 461±11.72 217±17.20 244±12.96
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self-regulation (e.g., sustained attention, memory, executive con-
trol, etc), which could act as potential confounds by affecting
self-regulation resources. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 partici-
pants were presented with solvable equations in the control sign
discrimination task. Although participants were asked to ignore
the solutions of problems and only report the sign of the equa-
tion, it is possible that participants were inadvertently solving these
tasks as they had adequate time due to the stimulus presenta-
tion times being held constant across the depletion and control
tasks.
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1
using a simple detection task with nonsensical equations as the
control non-depleting task in place of the sign discrimination task,
to remove the possibility that the observed effects are influenced
by subjects automatically solving the equations or processing the
symbolic meaning of the “sign” in the control task. It was hypoth-
esized that self-regulation depletion will be only observed for
participants with low performance accuracy on the arithmetic
task. Based on the outcomes of Experiment 1, it was also posited
that self-regulation will recover across consecutive blocks of the
SST without rest.
EXPERIMENT 2
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and procedure
Forty-eight adults participants (14 males and 34 females, M
Age= 23, 11 and SD= 6; 5 years; months) were subdivided into
two groups based on their performance on the arithmetic task:
low accuracy groups with error rates> 5% (n= 30, M error
rate= 3.05, SEM= 0.36) and a high accuracy group with error
rates< 5% (n= 18, M error rate= 11.61, SEM= 1.10). The low
accuracy group included 23 females and 7 males (M age= 23; 11,
SD= 6; 5), while the high accuracy group consisted of 11 females
and 7 males (M age= 22; 1, SD= 3; 7) Participants were paid
AUD$20 for their time.
All procedures for Experiment 2 were as in Experiment 1
with the exception of the sign discrimination task, which was
replaced with a simple detection task. For the simple detec-
tion task, the same equations were presented as in the arith-
metic task, however, all numbers were randomly replaced with
(unreadable) capital consonant letters to ensure that prob-
lems were unsolvable. The order of the detection task and
the arithmetic task was counterbalanced across participants.
Participants were instructed to randomly press buttons with
their middle and index finger upon the detection of an
equation.
In Experiment 2, some participants reported feeling fatigued
following the simple detection task, therefore we introduced
subjective measures completed by the last 42 participants.
To assess level of alertness, we used the Stanford Sleepiness
Scale (SSS) (Glenville and Broughton, 1978). Visual analog
scales (VAS), 10 cm in length, were also used to obtain par-
ticipant ratings of (1) how relaxed they felt (very relaxed –
very stressed), (2) how alert they felt (very tired/sleepy –
very alert), (3) how easy it was to concentrate (very easy
to concentrate – very difficult to concentrate), and (4) how
difficult the task was (very easy – very difficult). Subjective
measures took less than 1 min to complete at the end the arith-
metic and simple detection task (i.e., prior to commencing
the SST).
RESULTS
Performance across the 4 blocks of the arithmetic task was highly
correlated for both RTs (r> 0.8, p< 0.001 for all blocks) and
accuracy (r> 0.58, p< 0.001 for all blocks) measures. For the
simple detection task, error rates floored, averaging below 4%,
and motor RTs did not significantly differ between the high
(M= 401, SEM= 17.27) and low (M= 448, SEM= 25.53) accu-
racy groups, t (46)=−1.11, p> 0.05. For the arithmetic task,
using a two-way ANOVA RTs were found to be faster for addi-
tions (low accuracy group M= 1489, SEM= 53.57, and high
accuracy group M= 1265, SEM= 54.35) than subtractions (low
accuracy group M= 1637, SEM= 65.42, and high accuracy group
M= 1390, SEM= 60.81), F(1,46)= 83.64, p< 0.001, and partici-
pants in the high accuracy groups were significantly faster at solv-
ing question than those in the low accuracy groups,F(1,46)= 7.14,
p< 0.01.
A significant three-way interaction was observed for SSRT
impairment using a 2(group)× 2(task)× 3(block) ANOVA,
F(2,92)= 3.15,p< 0.05. The depletion of SSRT measures was only
observed for the low accuracy groups, which recovered by the third
block of the SST (Figure 3). Interestingly, a significant difference
between the accuracy groups was observed for block two only,
where participants in the high accuracy groups seem to show a
gain in their SSRT following the arithmetic task. Consistent with
Experiment 1, significant correlations were also observed between
overall measures of accuracy on the arithmetic task and measures
of SSRT depletion at block 1 (n= 48, r =−0.26, p< 0.05) and
block 2 (n= 48, r =−0.39, p< 0.01), but not block 3 (n= 48,
r = 0.04, p> 0.05).
Reaction times for go-signals were also affected by the pre-
ceding task (Table 2). A three-way ANOVA for go-RTs of SST
showed a significant main effect of task and group. RTs were sig-
nificantly slower for go-signals following the arithmetic task than
the simple detection task, F(1,92)= 9.99, p= 0.003, and overall
RTs for the low accuracy group were slower than the high accuracy
group, F(1,46)= 6.41, p= 0.02. A three-way ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of task for SSD measures too. SSDs were sig-
nificantly increased following the arithmetic task, F(1,92)= 6.36,
p= 0.02, however, SSD did not significantly differ between the
groups.
An assessment of subjective measures, using a series of two-
way ANOVAs, showed that participants scored significantly higher
on the SSS following the simple detection task, F(1,39)= 16.22,
p< 0.001 (see Table 3). VAS also indicated that participants were
significantly more relaxed, F(1,40)= 11.44, p= 0.002, and less
alert, F(1,40)= 9.58, p= 0.004 following the simple detection
task than the arithmetic task. Subjective measures of concentra-
tion did not differ between tasks and groups. However, accu-
racy group and proceeding task significantly interacted for the
subjective measure of difficulty, F(1,40)= 6.53, p= 0.01. Inter-
estingly, participants in the low accuracy group rated the simple
detection task to be significantly easier than the high accuracy
group. For the high accuracy group, subjective difficulty measures
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FIGURE 3 | Mean (±SEM) depletion measures for SSRT (A),
go-RT (B) and SSD (C), for the low accuracy (black line) and high
accuracy (gray line) groups across the three blocks of the
stop-signal task: Block 1 (0–5 min), Block 2 (5–10 min), and Block
3 (10–15 min). Depletion measures were calculated by subtracting
SST task measures following the arithmetic task from those that
followed the sign task (e.g., SSRT depletion=SSRT sign – SSRT
arithmetic), therefore, negative values are representative of a
depletion effect for SSRT and go-RT measures following the
arithmetic task (note that for SSD a negative value is representative
of an improvement in performance). Dashed gray line at zero depicts
no depletion or gain in performance.
Table 2 | Mean (±SEM) percentage (%) accuracy (ACC), motor reaction times for go-signals (go-RT), stop-signal delays (SSD), and stop-signal
reaction times (SSRT) for the three blocks of the stop-signal task following the simple detection task and the arithmetic task in Experiment 2.
Simple detection task Arithmetic task
ACC Go-RT SSD SSRT ACC Go-RT SSD SSRT
LOW
Block 1 50.93±0.63 484±13.61 247±13.66 237±5.31 50.40±0.65 507±13.07 259±13.01 248±4.15
Block 2 50.13±0.30 481±11.32 243±13.65 238±5.19 50.40±0.41 502±13.07 254±11.55 248±7.41
Block 3 50.13±0.22 496±12.23 248±12.77 248±5.33 50.13±0.19 498±9.63 254±11.54 244±6.47
HIGH
Block 1 48.00±0.86 431±12.62 207±16.71 224±8.13 49.33±0.92 450±15.08 230±19.11 220±8.67
Block 2 49.33±0.49 443±16.38 199±21.18 244±9.30 49.22±0.46 459±18.81 236±22.71 223±10.78
Block 3 49.70±0.32 450±15.41 216±22.41 233±10.12 49.11±0.39 465±16.88 231±21.51 235±9.79
did not significantly differ between the arithmetic and simple
detection task.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, we observed a sig-
nificant relationship between SSRT depletion measures on the
SST and performance accuracy on the arithmetic task; how-
ever in Experiment 2 significant recovery of SSRT depletion
was observed by block three of the task. Following the arith-
metic task, we also observed an unexpected gain in SSRTs at
block 2 for the high accuracy group, but a reverse decrement
in response inhibition for the low accuracy group further sug-
gesting that the two accuracy groups are affected differently
by the preceding task. RTs to go-signals of the SST were also
affected, significantly slowing down following the arithmetic
task, suggesting that depletion effects can generalize to other
processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study used stringent psychophysical measures to
demonstrate changes in self-regulation across unrelated cogni-
tive tasks independent of self-driven task persistence. Our results
indicate that cognitive tasks can have a temporary depleting effect
on unrelated self-regulation processes within individuals; how-
ever, such effects are dependent on task performance with some
individuals showing a reversal of the effect (i.e., a gain in per-
formance). These changes in self-regulation can generalize to
processes other than response inhibition when a simple detection
task is used as a control, suggesting that the effects are not limited
to task difficulty, and that relatively easy discrimination tasks with
minimal cognitive engagement can also influence self-regulation
processes.
The extent to which self-regulation is engaged within the cogni-
tive domain is dependent on task performance for individuals. In
both experiments, a significant relationship was observed between
arithmetic task performance and response inhibition measures.
Importantly, evidence of depletion was found within individuals
using the SST, which is a robust response inhibition task where
accuracy is controlled to the same baseline level and failure to
persist is not a salient option, suggesting that it is not just one’s
willingness to persist that is affected, but rather that initial effort
to self-regulate effects later capacity to self-regulate. This fact
makes a motivational explanation of results unlikely. Moreover,
the rapidity of recovery, in the absence of any factor that would be
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Table 3 | Mean (±SEM) subjective measures for the Stanford
Sleepiness Scale (SSS), and measure on the visual analog scales
(VAS) for relaxation, alertness, concentration and task difficulty.
Simple Detection Arithmetic
Low
Accuracy
High
Accuracy
Low
Accuracy
High
Accuracy
SST 3.52±0.27 3.57±0.33 2.37±0.22 2.71±0.34∧
VAS – relaxation 1.61±0.26 2.58±0.30 3.31±0.48 3.60±0.45∧
VAS – alertness 4.16±0.46 3.89±0.58 6.28±0.51 4.96±0.49∧
VAS – concentration 4.43±0.57 3.89±0.39 3.30±0.42 3.79±0.53
VAS – difficulty 0.80±0.24 2.24±0.54 3.46±0.46 2.63±0.49*
Note. ∧for a significant main effect of task, * for a significant interaction effect
between task and accuracy group.
For VAS 10 cm scales were used. Each end of the scale was labeled as follows.
Relaxation: very relaxed – very stressed.
Alertness: very tired/sleepy – very alert.
Concentration: very easy to concentrate – very difficult to concentrate.
Difficulty: very easy – very difficult.
expected to affect motivation, seems to indicate that motivation
does not explain performance on the SST. In Experiment 1, the
observed recovery in SSRT at block 2 and 3 was at the expense
of go-signal motor speed. However, go-signal RTs were signifi-
cantly faster following the simple detection task in Experiment
2, therefore changes in response inhibition (i.e., SSRTs) following
the arithmetic relative to the sign discrimination and the simple
detection task cannot be attributed to participants’ slowing down
to improve response inhibition performance in Experiment 2. In
addition, the findings cannot be explained by changes in sub-
jects’ state of alertness since both groups of participants reported
greater levels of alertness and less fatigue following the arithmetic
task, yet only the low accuracy groups showed poorer regulation
of response inhibition in Experiment 2. Also both groups reported
similar levels of concentration for both the arithmetic and control
task, with only measures of perceived task difficulty significantly
differing between the two groups. It has been argued that the level
of self-regulation engaged by such tasks is dependent on cogni-
tive performance and ability (Muraven et al., 1998; Baumeister
and Tierney, 2011). Consistent with this premise, in the present
study only individuals with low accuracy on the arithmetic task
showed sign of self-regulation depletion on an unrelated response
inhibition task. In previous work, higher fluid intelligence has
been associated with greater depletion (Shamosh and Gray, 2007).
However, those researchers used a non-cognitive depletion task (an
emotion regulation task); participants with high fluid intelligence
did not have an advantage over those with lower fluid intelligence
with regard to that depletion task. The participants in our exper-
iments with better arithmetical capacity may not have needed to
depend to any significant extent on self-regulation processes while
performing these tasks. In contrast, those who find arithmetic
problems challenging are more likely to find the task effortful and
draw upon processes engaging self-regulation, such as executive
control and working memory, leading to the overall depletion of
available resources.
In the present study, reduced performance on the arithmetic
task may reflect differences in arithmetic or task switching “abil-
ity,” or a reduced capacity to maintain control or attend during
the arithmetic task, resulting in the need for an individual to
up-regulate cognitive self-regulation processes. The question of
cognitive ability and its interplay with task switching effects is
interesting and could be further investigated by using indepen-
dent measures of performance on a cognitive task. One possible
explanation of the present findings is that the observed “deple-
tion” and recovery may be reflective of residual task switch costs,
which have been shown to have long lasting effects on perfor-
mance beyond the immediate switch, with the magnitude of the
cost decreasing with practice (e.g., Wylie and Allport, 2000; Mon-
sell, 2003; Berryhill and Hughes, 2009). Individuals who perform
poorly on a given task (i.e., in the present case the arithmetic task)
may be more prone to such residual task switch costs. Alternatively,
the results might also be explained by phasic shifts in attention or
some other construct. If that hypothesis were correct, the place-
ment of subjects into groups based on their performance on the
arithmetic task and their subsequent SSRT performance might
simply reflect such transitory shifts, rather than being the effect of
the manipulation. The subsequent improvement in performance
could therefore be the product of a recovery from this phasic shift
and not the washing-out of depletion. The current results may
also be influenced by regression to the mean. This explanation is
unlikely, because regression to the mean predicts that participants
who score lower at one time are likely to score higher at another
and vice versa; therefore, it predicts an improvement in perfor-
mance following the arithmetic task relative to the control task
in the high accuracy group, and vice versa for the low accuracy
group. These are possibilities important to pursue in subsequent
work, as it is conceivable that they can contribute to the observed
results.
At odds with the predictions of the strength model, and with
our second hypothesis, self-regulation depletion in the low accu-
racy group appeared to recover by block 2 of the SST in Experiment
1, and block 3 in Experiment 3, suggesting that response inhi-
bition processes were only temporarily altered with participants
quickly regaining and up-regulating their ability to inhibit pro-
ponent responses even in the absence of a rest period. However,
it is important to note that this recovery was at the expense of
response speed to go-signals. More interestingly, in Experiment 2
participants in the high accuracy group, but the not the low accu-
racy group, showed a significant gain in SSRTs by the second block
of the SST. These findings conflict with previous suggestions that
motivational incentives (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003; Stewart
et al., 2009) or glucose (e.g., Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007; Gail-
liot et al., 2007) are required to restore self-regulation processes
in the absence of rest. The findings are also inconsistent with the
idea of “conservation” of self-regulation resources (Muraven et al.,
2006), given that recovery was observed by block 2 in experiment
1 and block 3 in Experiment 2. If participants with poor accuracy
were conserving self-regulation resources, then we would expect
recovery only on block 3 for both experiments. The results of
the present study align with Converse and Deshon (2009), who
showed self-regulation depletion with two consecutive tasks, but
improvements when three consecutive self-regulation tasks were
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employed, suggesting that cognitive self-regulation processes can
adapt given sufficient time and practice. Each block of the SST
lasted approximately 5 min, which may be enough time for learn-
ing and practice to lead to the automation of processes, reducing
reliance on self-regulation mechanisms. When the relative differ-
ence in reliance on self-regulation processes is amplified between
the depleting and comparative control task (i.e., in our case a
discrimination vs. a detection task), the time needed for recov-
ery may be prolonged. Alternatively, the observed fluctuations
in self-regulation across and within tasks may reflect changes
in arousal levels with task difficulty as predicted by the Yerkes-
Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908; Lupien et al., 2007).
Indeed previously arithmetic tasks have been shown to be effec-
tive at altering arousal levels (Peters et al., 1998; Chatkoff et al.,
2010); however, recovery from both acute and chronic cogni-
tive and physical stressors is very rapid (Chatkoff et al., 2010;
Sander et al., 2010), and unlikely to transfer from the arithmetic
to the SST. The availability of self-regulation resources within the
cognitive domain appears to evolve rapidly with time, and fur-
ther research is needed to understand the behavioral and neural
mechanisms driving these dynamic changes in self-regulation
resources.
A surprising finding of the present study is that self-
regulation depletion generalized to effect the go-signal RT of
the SST. The increase in go-signal response times was cou-
pled with an increase in stopping delays following the arith-
metic task, which may reflect strategic changes in the way
the SST is performed following the arithmetic task. However,
these changes did not completely counteract SSRT depletion
in Experiment 2, suggesting that both SSRT and go-signal RTs
are adversely affected, with the effects being more pronounced
when a simple detection task is used as a comparative con-
trol. Indeed the simplest of psychophysical tasks tax multi-
ple capacities involved in self-regulation and, in turn, have
the potential to tax self-regulation resources. Asking partici-
pants to ignore equations and focus on the sign of the oper-
ation, although cognitively less engaging, still places a con-
siderable demand on sustained attention, reducing the likeli-
hood of seeing a difference in stop-signal task measures fol-
lowing the arithmetic task. Further reducing self-regulatory
demands by using a simple detection task we observed an
increase in go-signal RTs for both groups, which are also partly
dependent on one’s ability to regulate their own behavior.
This may reflect a generalization of depletion to other cognitive
processes beyond self-regulation. Indeed, there is converging evi-
dence from human electrophysiological and functional imaging
studies suggesting that the go- and stop-signal in SSTs engage dif-
ferent frontal-parietal and frontal-striatal neural networks (e.g.,
Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Dimoska et al., 2006; Schmajuk et al.,
2006; Alegre et al., 2008; Dimoska and Johnstone, 2008; Hus-
ter et al., 2010, 2011). Further research is needed to understand
the relationship between self-regulation depletion and cognitive
demands and their neural substrates.
Typically, successful self-regulation across a range of domains
has been related to top-down control from prefrontal regions
with the target of control being posterior cortical and subcor-
tical regions (reviewed in Aron, 2007; Cohen and Lieberman,
2010; Heatherton and Wagner, 2011). Cognitive control tasks,
such as switching tasks, are associated with neural networks of
activation generally involving medial and lateral regions of the
prefrontal cortex including the left dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), the parietal lobe, supplementary motor areas (pre-
SMA), and subcortical regions (e.g., Kimberg et al., 2000; Mac-
Donald et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000; Brass and von Cramon,
2002; Rushworth et al., 2002; Monsell, 2003; Savine and Braver,
2010). Similarly, response inhibition on the SST has been associ-
ated with activity of the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), DLPFC,
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the pre-SMA, the globus pallidus, and
the right subthalamic nucleus (STN) (e.g., Aron and Poldrack,
2006; Li et al., 2006; Chikazoe et al., 2009; Duann et al., 2009).
Although switch tasks and SSTs are likely to engage different
frontal-parietal and fontal-striatal networks, they do share com-
mon neural links, for example, with the prefrontal cortex. Lesions
to prefrontal cortical regions have been shown to result in per-
formance deficits on both switching tasks and the SST (Rogers
et al., 1998; Keele and Rafal, 2000; Aron et al., 2004a,b; Rob-
bins, 2007). Prefrontal brain regions have previously been shown
to be susceptible to resource depletion. For example, racial bias
believed to deplete executive attention resources, can predict right
DLPFC activity, and changes in right DLPFC activity in white
individuals after being exposed to black individuals have been
shown to predict performance on a preceding unrelated color
Stroop task (Richeson et al., 2003). Thus, one neural basis for
the cross influence between the arithmetic switching task and
the SST task observed in the present study may be the pre-
frontal cortex, though further research is required to validate this
hypothesis.
The current findings suggest that the strength model is lim-
ited in its ability to explain the dynamic nature of self-regulation,
and its ability to up-regulate without rest. These findings partly
explain why people are able to withstand situations requir-
ing extended periods of self-regulation demand. A dip in self-
regulation resources may activate compensatory processes to meet
environmental or situational demands. However, these effects may
be dependent on the level of cognitive demand; there may be situa-
tions where self-regulation may not be able to self-recover without
rest or glucose intake, which need to be investigated further.
Given that self-regulation is a process that extends across mul-
tiple domains ranging from cognition cognitive control, including
inhibition of behaviors and impulsivity, to social and person-
ality traits, it is likely that self-regulation may be able to up-
regulate and compensate for dips in self-regulation across other
domains too.
The availability of self-regulation resources within the cogni-
tive domain is dynamic and susceptible to various independent
influences. Contrary to the claims of the majority of researchers
on the topic, rest (or glucose) are not required to restore self-
regulation resources. Indeed in some individuals self-regulation
can even improve after engaging in a cognitively demanding
task. Further research is needed to understand the dynamics self-
regulatory processes as such research may help identify situations
in which some people are more likely to experience lapses in
their ability to self-regulate and engage in undesired or harmful
behavior.
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